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chapter ten
 Man- Machines and Embodiment
From Cartesian Physiology to Claude Bernard’s 
“Living Machine”
Philippe Huneman and Charles T. Wolfe
1. The Problem of Polysemous Embodiment
In what follows we seek to trace and reconstruct, through a series of 
examples running from the early modern Cartesian context through 
Enlightenment materialism to mid- 19th- century medicine, a revised 
concept of embodiment as emerging out of naturalistic, mechanism- 
friendly practices in the life sciences and in theoretical efforts relating 
to such practices. Such an approach runs directly counter to the com-
mon understanding in which “embodiment” (whether it is approached 
historically or from a contemporary standpoint) is precisely what the 
scientific study of organic life “misses.” But what is embodiment? Or 
more precisely, when a concept of embodiment is invoked in, inter 
alia, scholarship on Descartes or Spinoza, early modern “cultures of 
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the body,” or the study of embodied cognition (to list some exam-
ples1) what concept is this, if there is any conceptual unity here at all? 
Broadly speaking, in the study of cognition, “embodied mind” per-
spectives reject traditional computational approaches and present our 
cerebral life as necessarily occurring within a body, understood both 
as a dynamic system and as something fundamentally my own in the 
sense of Merleau- Ponty’s corps propre: I am not “in my body,” on this 
view, as if I were in a merely material container; instead, I sense in a 
profound way that my body is my own.2 The emphasis here usually 
falls on how an embodied agent inhabits the world, not as one body 
amongst others (atoms and asteroids and bottles) but as a subject in her 
own environment. In cultural studies, embodiment seems to connote a 
complex relation between historicity and gender, in which “subjectiv-
ity [is] profoundly experienced as interrelated with the physical, and 
societal changes or structures influenced the ways in which the body 
was perceived,”3 through scientific discourses but also in many other 
ways.4 Embodiment here is not the facts about our biology but, para-
doxically, about our historicity:
 1 For example, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, “Descartes on Thinking with the Body,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. J. Cottingham (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1992), 371– 392; Iris Marion Young, On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like a Girl” and 
Other Essays (New  York:  Oxford University Press, 2005); Lawrence Shapiro, Embodied Cognition 
(London: Routledge, 2011).
 2 Maurice Merleau- Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith (London:  Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1962), 104.
 3 Ursula Rublack, “Fluxes: The Early Modern Body and the Emotions,” History Workshop Journal 53 
(2002), 13.
 4 Aside from the variety of works in “history of the body” that appeared at a bewildering rate during 
the 1980s and 1990s, in early modern studies one can mention Caroline W. Bynum, “Why All the 
Fuss about the Body? A Medievalist’s Perspective,” Critical Inquiry 22 (1995); T. Reiss, “Denying the 
Body? Memory and the Dilemmas of History in Descartes,” Journal of the History of Ideas 57, no. 4 
(1996); G.K. Paster, “Nervous Tension: Networks of Blood and Spirit in the Early Modern Body,” 
in The Body in Parts, eds. D. Hillman and C. Mazzio (London: Routledge, 1997); and in embodied 
cognitive science, Young, Throwing Like a Girl; for interesting and original ways of extending and 
modifying their programs, combining a sense of historicized embodiment with notions in “histori-
cal cognitive science,” see John Sutton, “Spongy Brains and Material Memories,” in Embodiment and 
Environment in Early Modern England, eds. M. Floyd- Wilson and G. Sullivan (London: Palgrave, 
2010). For a recent attempt to compensate for the total absence of “embodiment” discourse in the 
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There is no clear set of structures, behaviors, events, objects, experi-
ences, words, and moments to which body currently refers. Rather, 
it seems to me, the term conjures up two sharply different groups of 
phenomena. Sometimes body, my body, or embodiedness seems to 
refer to limit or placement, whether biological or social. That is, it 
refers to natural, physical structures (such as organ systems or chro-
mosomes), to environment or locatedness, boundary or definition, 
or to role (such as gender, race, class) as constraint. Sometimes on 
the other hand it seems to refer precisely to lack of limits, that is, to 
desire, potentiality, fertility, or sensuality/ sexuality … or to person 
or identity as malleable representation or construct. Thus body can 
refer to the organs on which a physician operates or to the assump-
tions about race and gender implicit in a medical textbook, to the 
particular trajectory of one person’s desire or to inheritance patterns 
and family structures.5
The “lived body” we encounter in contemporary embodiment 
discourse is the body in pain, or in a state of enjoyment; in a reflex-
ive, indeed intimate relation to itself— quite different, according to 
embodiment theorists, from the more generic body in space. They 
maintain that the lived body (which is the only relevant sense of the 
body for them) exists at least in part “outside of physical space.”6 Thus 
the living body— indeed, any organism— ”is an individual in a sense 
which is not that of modern physics” (ibid., 154). This is often pre-
sented in cultural studies as an insight countering “Cartesianism.” So, 
Jonathan Sawday, in his otherwise impressive study of early modern 
anatomy, The Body Emblazoned, refers to the rise of a Cartesian mecha-
nistic world- picture and states that “As a machine, the body became 
history of science (here, early modern life science), see the essays collected in Charles T. Wolfe and 
Ofer Gal, eds., The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010).
 5 Bynum, “Why All the Fuss about the Body?” 5.
 6 Maurice Merleau- Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, trans. A.L. Fisher (Boston: Beacon, 1963), 209.
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objectified; a focus of intense curiosity, but entirely divorced from 
the world of the speaking and thinking subject.”7 That this is a rather 
impoverished and historically unfortunate portrayal of early modern 
mechanism is not germane to the present paper, although it is worth 
exploring elsewhere.
We are faced already with one general problem: the gap between 
discourses of embodiment and the complexity of “body” and bio-
logical or medical terms as understood from the standpoint of the 
history and philosophy of the life sciences. That is, cultural discus-
sions of early modern embodiment usually position themselves coun-
ter to a kind of “mainstream science,” which they present as alienated 
and alienating, as quantitative and reductionist, and of course dehu-
manizing. The quantitative and reductionist part turns out to be 
partly true but more complicated; the rest is at best highly debat-
able, not least given the importance of reflections on “organism” and 
“organismic” approaches at least since the Leibniz- Stahl debate, and 
prominently part of physiological discussions in the era of Claude 
Bernard.8 This complexity can be shown in a variety of cases, rang-
ing from recent reinterpretations of Descartes on life, passions, and 
physiology, the role of early modern automata in modelling vital 
processes (and thus creating bridges in between the mechanical and 
the organic); vital materialism understood as a form of material-
ism specifically concerned with body and vitality; and lastly, vitalist 
 7 Sawday, The Body Emblazoned:  Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 29. Thus present- day embodied mind theorists assert quite bluntly that 
“Life is not physical in the standard materialist sense of purely external structure and function. Life 
realizes a kind of interiority, the interiority of selfhood and sense- making. We accordingly need an 
expanded notion of the physical to account for the organism or living being” (Evan Thompson, Mind 
in Life [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007], 238). In fact, this “expanded notion of the 
physical” has always been present; it is rather the picture of “standard materialism” that needs to be 
revised.
 8 This problem of doing justice to embodiment without producing a strictly reactive historiogra-
phy matches up with the problem surrounding the Scientific Revolution and the “death of Nature” 
(Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature:  Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution [San 
Francisco:  Harper and Row, 1980]; see John Sutton and Evelyn B. Tribble, “Materialists Are Not 
Merchants of Vanishing,” Early Modern Culture 9 (2011), for an inspiring critique of her view).
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models of the “animal economy” in the mid- eighteenth century and 
their combined reprisal and rejection in nineteenth- century experi-
mental medicine, from Bichat to Bernard. We shall discuss four 
cases:  Descartes and medicine (section 2), embodied materialism 
versus the older concept of mechanistic materialism (section 3), 
and the emergence of organismic yet mechanism- friendly models 
in nineteenth- century medicine such as Bichat’s physiology, leading 
up to Claude Bernard’s notion of “machine vivante” (section 4); the 
status of vitalism, including its scientific pertinence, is addressed in 
sections 3 and 4.
2. Body and Soul in a Medical Context
Contrary to the standard picture of Descartes the substance dual-
ist, whose understanding of nature is so purely mechanistic that 
no particular features of “life” or “bodies” subsist in a nonreduced 
form, scholars including Gaukroger, Sutton, Des Chene, and, differ-
ently, Shapiro have pointed to the presence of functional concepts 
in Cartesian physiology: of body- soul union (in the correspondence 
with Elizabeth) and of a notion of health and consequently normativ-
ity generated out of the body- machine concept.9 This is not to say 
that Descartes did not influentially adopt a deflationary approach 
to embodiment, or that iatromechanism10 should be confused with, 
say, Georg- Ernst Stahl’s focus on the holistic properties of organism 
and the temporal character of disease, as presented for instance in his 
 9 See for instance Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, “Descartes on Thinking with the Body”; John Sutton, 
“The Body and the Brain,” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, eds. S. Gaukroger, J.A. Schuster, and J. 
Sutton (London: Routledge, 2000); Lisa Shapiro, “The Health of the Body- Machine? Or Seventeenth 
Century Mechanism and the Concept of Health,” Perspectives on Science 11, no. 4 (2003) and, differ-
ently, Dennis Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001) (e.g.,  chapter 6 [on functio and usus]).
 10 “Iatromechanism” designates a school of medical and physiological thought that extensively views 
living bodies as mechanical devices, wholly following the laws of mechanics and likely to be under-
stood, analyzed, and cured through them.
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critique of Leibniz.11 As concerns Cartesian mechanism as apparently 
a denial or reduction of embodiment, passages like this one from the 
Treatise on Man are numerous (as they are in authors such as Borelli, 
Pitcairne, Croome, and beyond):
Indeed one may very well compare the nerves of the machine which 
I am describing with the tubes of the machines of those fountains, 
the muscles and tendons of the machine with the other various 
engines and springs which serve to move these machines, and the 
animal spirits, the source of which is the heart and of which the 
ventricles of the brain are the reservoirs, with the water which puts 
them in motion. Moreover breathing and other like acts which are 
natural and usual to the machine and which depend on the flow of 
the spirits are like the movements of a clock or of a mill which the 
ordinary flow of water can keep going continually.12
Yet we must summarily make two observations that nuance the 
picture of the Cartesian body- machine as merely a “machine made of 
earth.” The first is internal to Descartes’ system and concerns the extent 
to which features as diverse as sensation, self- preservation, health, 
function, and perhaps even a “life principle” are— surprisingly— 
irreducible.13 The second is more external and concerns medical mecha-
nism as a whole.
 11 Georg Ernst Stahl, Negotium otiosum, seu Schiamaxia adversus positiones aliquas fundamentales 
theoriae verae medicaea Viro quodam celeberrimo intentata sed adversis armis conversis (Halle: Impensis 
Orphanotrophei, 1720).
 12 AT XI 131; CSM I, 100. Cf. also the passage in the Sixth Meditation on the “health” of a watch: “A 
clock constructed with wheels and weights observes all the laws of its nature just as closely when it 
is badly made and tells the wrong time as when it completely fulfills the wishes of the clockmaker. In 
the same way, I might consider the body of a man as a kind of machine equipped with and made up 
of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood, and skin in such a way that, even if there were no mind in it, 
it would still perform all the same movements as it now does in those cases where the movement is 
not under the control of the will or, consequently, of the mind” (AT VI, 84; CSM II: 58); thanks to 
Christoffer Basse Eriksen for discussion on this).
 13 See Fred Ablondi, “Automata, Living and Non- Living: Descartes’ Mechanical Biology and His 
Criteria for Life,” Biology and Philosophy 13, no. 2 (1998) and the discussion in Barnaby Hutchins, 
“Descartes and the Dissolution of Life,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54, no. 2 (2016).
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For the “body- soul” problem— arguably the immediate ancestor of 
the “mind- body” problem, inasmuch as it was concerned with pos-
sible relations between corporeal states and mental processes— was 
also a medical one. With reference to the Cartesian context alone, 
entire books have been written just on the specifically medical con-
text of Cartesianism.14 Both during Descartes’ own lifetime and in the 
following decades, numerous physicians claimed to be carrying out a 
legitimate Cartesian project (e.g. eliminating final causes and explain-
ing all of nature mechanically, including the human body, while in 
fact moving ever closer to an integrated view of psychosomatic pro-
cesses). Thus Henricus Regius, a physician and Professor of Theoretical 
Medicine at the University of Utrecht, often called the “first apostle 
of Cartesianism” (e.g., in a review in the Nouvelles de la république 
des lettres in October 1686), asserted that the soul could be a mode 
of the body, with the body being understood as a machine, and that 
the human mind, inasmuch as it exists in a body, is organic.15 Even 
Marx (borrowing from Renouvier’s history of philosophy) mentioned 
Regius as a precursor of La Mettrie:  “Descartes was still alive when 
Le Roy applied to the human soul the Cartesian idea of animal struc-
ture, and declared that the soul was but a mode of the body, and ideas 
were but mechanical motions.”16 Others have asserted that Descartes 
was too timid, and one should be a Cartesian in physiology while 
eliminating substance dualism in favor of a parallelism of physical 
events and mental events (Louis de La Forge17); or, rather tortuously, 
 14 Most recently, Annie Bitbol- Hespériès, Le principe de vie chez Descartes (Paris:  Vrin, 1990); 
Vincent Aucante, La philosophie médicale de Descartes (Paris:  PUF, 2006); and Gideon Manning, 
“Out on the Limb: The Place of Medicine in Descartes’ Philosophy,” Early Science and Medicine 12, 
no. 2 (2007) (a useful review essay).
 15 Henricus Regius, Fundamenta physices (Amsterdam: Elzevier, 1646), 248, 246. For more discussion of 
Regius see the excellent analysis in Delphine Bellis, “Empiricism Without Metaphysics: Regius’ Cartesian 
Natural Philosophy,” in Cartesian Empiricisms, eds. M. Dobre and T. Nyden- Bullock the book names her 
as Tammy Nyden : http:// www.springer.com/ la/ book/ 9789400776890 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014).
 16 Marx, The Holy Family, VI, 3, d, discussed in Olivier Bloch, “Marx, Renouvier et l’histoire du 
matérialisme,” La Pensée 191 (1977).
 17 Louis de La Forge, Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, de ses facultés et de ses fonctions, et de son union avec 
le corps, suivant les principes de René Descartes (Paris: Théodore Girard, 1666), ch. XV.
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have tried to argue “from” Descartes toward a materialist account of 
mind- body interaction, at times seeking to integrate Cartesianism 
and Epicureanism.18 Such thinkers tried to collapse their ideas into 
Descartes’ own, but others— perhaps tellingly, outside of France— 
were quicker to dispense with any monopoly Descartes might have had 
over the prestige of mechanism in medicine, like Herman Boerhaave 
(1668– 1738) or Hieronymus Gaub (1705– 1780).
Boerhaave’s 1690 doctoral thesis in philosophy at Leiden, where 
he was later Professor of Medicine, Botany, and Chemistry (he was 
widely viewed as the most influential lecturer in medicine in Europe, 
and taught figures including La Mettrie, Gaub and Haller) was 
entitled De distinctione mentis a corpora, and there he argued for a 
distinction between mind and body. But in his later Praelectiones aca-
demicae (1739), he denied any medical or physiological pertinence to 
the distinction between body and soul or mind understood as a form 
of substance dualism (§ 27). Body and mind are united and commu-
nicate with and mutually affect one another, and a change occurring 
in the one produces a change in the other; this view may explain the 
unfair accusations of Spinozism that were laid against him. Boerhaave 
admits that he has no way of explaining the interaction between body 
and mind experimentally.19 He considers three hypotheses: “physical 
influx,” occasional causes, and divine harmony, and opts for the last 
(§ 27.7). He adds a remark that was repeated, with or without attribu-
tion, many times during this period (similar comments can be found in 
Galen): physicians should only concern themselves with the body, even 
when dealing with mental illness (or “diseases of the soul”), for once the 
body is working correctly, the mind will return to its proper “officium” 
 18 Henri Busson, La religion des classiques (Paris: PUF, 1948).
 19 La Mettrie was quick to fill in the descriptive gaps in Boerhaave’s psychophysiology, both in his 
edition and translation of Boerhaave’s lectures (Institutions de médecine de M. Hermann Boerhaave, 
trans. with commentary by La Mettrie, 2nd ed., vol. 5 out of 8. Paris: Huart & Cie, 1747), and in his 
own writings.
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(§ 27.8)— the ancient Stoic term for the role we are destined to play, 
which in this context can be rendered as “function.”20
Boerhaave’s student Gaub, who took over his Chair in Leiden, gave 
a lecture there in 1747 which La Mettrie claimed to have attended 
(some months prior to finishing L’Homme- Machine), entitled De 
regimine mentis. This text is important for us because there Gaub sug-
gests a clinical perspective on the problem of mind- body interaction 
(for he is speaking of mens rather than anima, reflecting a process of 
naturalization which is underway in this period).21 La Mettrie spoke 
favorably about the ideas he heard, and his enthusiasm22 makes sense, 
for Gaub had defended the view that for the physician, the metaphysi-
cal distinction between mind and body is irrelevant. “Although the 
healing aspect of medicine properly looks toward the human body 
only, rather than the whole man, it does refer to a body closely united 
to a mind and, by virtue of their union, almost continually acting on 
its companion as well as being itself affected in turn.”23 Gaub refers 
to the authority of Descartes, “the most ingenious philosopher of his 
age,” who “yielded to physicians” regarding the priority of medicine in 
these matters (74)24, and states that due to the variability of tempera-
ments, itself explainable in humoral (and hence medical) terms, the 
 20 On “officio” or “office” as a functional, teleological, or “teleomechanical” concept in early modern 
medicine, see Charles T. Wolfe, “Teleomechanism Redux? Functional Physiology and Hybrid Models 
of Life in Early Modern Natural Philosophy,” Gesnerus 71, no. 2 (2014): 290– 307.
 21 John P. Wright, “Substance vs. Function Dualism in Eighteenth- Century Medicine,” in Psyche and 
Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind– Body Problem from Antiquity to the Enlightenment, 
eds. J.P. Wright and P. Potter (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), 249. Gaub, like Haller, did not appreci-
ate La Mettrie’s materialist appropriation of his ideas, and in 1763 included a short essay against La 
Mettrie in his new edition of De regimine mentis, calling him “a little Frenchman” who produced a 
“repulsive offspring … his mechanical man” (in L.J. Rather, Mind and Body in Eighteenth- Century 
Medicine. A Study Based on J. Gaub’s De regimine mentis [Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1965], 115).
 22 More on which in our penultimate section.
 23 Gaub, De regimine mentis (1747), in Rather, Mind and Body in Eighteenth- Century Medicine, 70, 
emphasis ours.
 24 Gaub has in mind the passage from Part VI of Descartes’ Discours de la méthode where Descartes 
notes the interpenetration of mind and the organs of the body, so that medicine is the best way to 
render people wiser than they have hitherto been (AT VI, 62).
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philosopher “cannot dispense with the aid of the physician” where the 
mind is concerned (86).
So whereas some of the Cartesians, Boerhaave, and Gaub thought 
that the body- soul union (or relation, depending on their convictions) 
fell under the medical purview, but that it was perhaps best to focus 
on the body, others were more aggressively materialist in asserting the 
autonomy of medicine with respect to theology or other disciplines. 
Thus Boerhaave’s advice to physicians (“only concern yourself with the 
body”) becomes, in the Montpellier physician Ménuret de Chambaud’s 
entry “Mort” in the Encyclopédie, more radical:
The separation of the soul from the body, a mystery which may be 
even more incomprehensible than its union, is a theological dogma 
certified by religion, and consequently is uncontestable. But it is in 
no way in agreement with the lights of reason, nor is it based on any 
medical observation; hence we will not mention it in this purely 
medical article, in which we will restrict ourselves to describing 
the changes of the body, which, as they alone fall under the senses, 
can be grasped by the physicians, those sensual artists, sensuales 
artifices.25
Here the medicalization is administered in such strong doses that 
the concept of soul falls out altogether.
But these attempts to articulate and justify a specifically medi-
cal approach to body- soul relations (which will gradually be termed 
“body- mind” relations by the later eighteenth century) can also accept 
substance dualism, albeit idiosyncratically. William Cullen, in physi-
ological lectures given at the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh 
in the mid- 1760s, reflected on substance dualism, not in order to 
reject it, but to give it a peculiarly medical cast. For Cullen, we can 
 25 Ménuret de Chambaud, “Mort,” Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des 
métiers, eds. D. Diderot & J. D’Alembert (Paris: Briasson, 1765), X, 718b.
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know the mechanism(s) governing our bodies, not that which governs 
our minds. Yet, like Boerhaave, he also thinks that our mental states 
are inseparable from “some conditions in the body.”26 But— perhaps 
on ideological grounds— Cullen immediately appealed to the good 
reputation of Boerhaave and Haller, who were never “suspected of 
Irreligion.” However, he also recognizes that the mind- body problem 
remains problematic for physicians as well; but the specifically medical 
version of the problem as he states it sounds much like an embodied 
materialist statement from Diderot or La Mettrie, as we shall discuss 
below:  it reduces “the problem of the action of the mind upon the 
body” to the problem: “how one State of the body or of one part can 
affect another part of it.” Such reduction is a reduction to states of 
the body, in accordance with explanations of bodily processes; it is not a 
reduction to some “fundamental physics” or to the properties of mat-
ter as a whole.
Similar (although not in medical- historical terms) to Cullen’s way 
of defending substance dualism while insisting on a specifically medi-
cal variant, the Paris physician Antoine Le Camus, in his Médecine 
de l’esprit (1753), put forth the program that medicine should know 
both minds and bodies, so that it can perfect the mind by acting on the 
body. Le Camus notes that most people would not deny medicine’s 
expertise when it comes to the body, but they would be reluctant to 
grant it authority over the mind, and he wants to remedy this situa-
tion: “to remedy to the vices of the mind is nothing other than to rem-
edy the vices of the body.”27 Although phrased in terms of Cartesian 
dualism, Le Camus’ conception of medicine and of therapeutics is 
a different creature, for it belongs to the conceptual scheme of the 
 26 Cullen, notes added to “Lectures on the Institutes of Medicine,” cit. in Wright, “Substance vs. 
Function Dualism in Eighteenth- Century Medicine,” 244.
 27 Antoine Le Camus, Médecine de l’esprit, où l’on traite des dispositions et des causes physiques qui sont des 
conséquences de l’union de l’âme avec le corps, influant sur les opérations de l’esprit; et des moyens de maîtriser 
ses opérations dans un bon état ou de les corriger quand elles sont viciées (Paris: Ganeau, 1753), I, 7; “God 
only excites ideas in our souls relative to the dispositions in our bodies” (ibid., ch. III, section 2, 49).
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“animal economy”— a more integrated, organizational approach,28 as 
we discuss below. Although his title suggests that Le Camus is a sort of 
Cartesian (since the Cartesian thesis is that passions are effects of the 
mind- body union on the mind), he has a more expansive conception 
of medicine. Similarly, Le Camus gestures initially in a Cartesian direc-
tion, saying he knows the soul is rational and immortal, but he imme-
diately adds that it is also true that the soul is “aided in its operations” 
by “genuinely mechanical causes.”29 Le Camus’s program for medicine 
holds that it is the science which has equal knowledge of mind and 
body, and hence can treat their “abstract combinations” and their “rela-
tions” (commerce). While he still refers to these as two substances in his 
terminology, in practice he gives an integrated account of “virtues” and 
“passions” as being as much part of the body as of the soul.30
3. Mechanistic Materialism or Materialist 
Embodiment? Vitalist Intimations
The medical outlook here allows for a particular kind of materialism, 
in which embodiment is not reducible to more general claims about 
how what is real is (a)  body. Contrast this more integrated sense of 
“the body” with Hobbes’s “That which is not body is no part of the 
universe…there is no motion save of corporeal substance”31 or the 
assertion that Nature in its entirety is a “weave of bodies” (tissure de 
corps), in an intriguing, then- anonymous work of medical materialism 
known as the Parity of Life and Death (1714) by the eighteenth- century 
 28 Huneman, “‘Animal Economy’: Anthropology and the Rise of Psychiatry from the Encyclopédie 
to the Alienists,” in The Anthropology of the Enlightenment, eds. Larry Wolff and Marco Cipolloni 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 266.
 29 Le Camus, Médecine de l’esprit, I, xviii.
 30 Le Camus, Médecine de l’esprit, I, 111f.; II, 239.
 31 Hobbes, Leviathan, IV, § xlvi, ed. E. Curley with selected Latin variants (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1994), 459; Hobbes, Thomas White’s “De Mundo” Examined (approx. 1642– 1643), trans. H.W. Jones 
(London: Bradford University Press, 1976), ch. 37, § 4, 447.
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physician and materialist Abraham Gaultier.32 Diderot gives a more 
explicitly reductionist cast to the claim that “all is body,” when, in a 
major unpublished work which occupied him during the last two 
decades of his life, the Elements of Physiology, he explains that “the 
action of the soul on the body is the action of one part of the body on 
another, and the action of the body on the soul is again that of one part 
of the body on another” and, in his marginal commentary on Franz 
Hemsterhuis’ 1772 Lettre sur l’homme, “wherever I read soul I replace it 
with man or animal.”33 Similarly, La Mettrie in his first philosophical 
work, the Natural History of the Soul (1745, later revised under the title 
Treatise on the Soul), declares that “he who wishes to know the proper-
ties of the soul must first search for those which manifest themselves 
clearly in the body,” and a few years later, in Man a Machine:  “But 
since all the faculties of the soul depend to such a degree on the brain 
and the whole body’s own organization that they visibly are nothing 
but this organization itself— here is a machine bien éclairée! (really, a 
sophisticated machine; Eds).”34
That the historian of philosophy concerned with mind- body rela-
tions, mechanism and the status of the soul in a context of “naturaliza-
tion” ignores the medical context at her peril, is one lesson emerging 
from the above. The same applies to the specific case of materialism, 
with an additional “moral” regarding its well- known assimilation to 
the position known as “mechanistic materialism.” For one often hears 
that proper materialism— that of Hobbes, d’Holbach, and also what 
will become “physicalism” in the twentieth century— reduces all causes 
to physical causes, and all matter to a kind of mechanistically (and by 
 32 Abraham Gaultier, Parité de la vie et de la mort. La Réponse du médecin Gaultier (1714), ed. O. 
Bloch (Paris: Voltaire Foundation, 1993), 167; he is actually discussing Spinoza’s views.
 33 Diderot, Éléments de physiologie (a work which on every page seeks to explore connections between 
“physiological” ideas of living bodies and philosophical materialism), in Diderot, DPV XVII, 334– 
335; Diderot, in François Hemsterhuis, Lettre sur l’homme et ses rapports (1772), avec le commentaire 
inédit de Diderot, ed. G. May (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press/ Paris: PUF, 1964), 277.
 34 Traité de l’âme, I, in La Mettrie, Œuvres philosophiques, ed. F. Markovits (Paris: Fayard- ”Corpus,” 
1987), I, 125; L’Homme- Machine, ibid., I, 73.
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extension mathematically) specifiable matter. This view was promi-
nently expressed by a thinker not so frequently cited in scholarly con-
texts, Friedrich Engels, in a statement as rewarding of study as it is rife 
with mistakes:
The materialism of the past century was predominantly mechanis-
tic, because at that time … only the science of mechanics … had 
reached any sort of completion…. For the materialists of the eigh-
teenth century, man was a machine. This exclusive application of 
the standards of mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic 
nature— in which the laws of mechanics are also valid, but are 
pushed into the background by other, higher laws— constitutes the 
specific (and at that time, inevitable) limitation of classical French 
materialism.35
There are two major mistakes here.
One is the belief that chemistry emerged suddenly in the nineteenth 
century. On the contrary, matter theory, materialism, and “philoso-
phies of nature” in the eighteenth century, from Stahl to Rouelle and 
Venel, including individuals attending Rouelle’s lectures at the Jardin 
du Roi (like Diderot who was an active participant for three years in 
the 1750s) were chemically obsessed.36 Diderot’s metaphysics of a uni-
versally sensing matter (i.e., his enhanced materialism in which sen-
sitivity [sensibilité, typically translated “sensibility”] is an irreducible 
property of matter), is laden with chemical concepts and vocabulary, 
in a usage (not unique to him) of the image of the chemical laboratory 
 35 Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, in Marx & 
Engels, Werke, vol. 21 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, [1888] 1982), 278; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic 
Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. L.S. Feuer (New York: Doubleday/ Anchor Books, 1959), 211.
 36 On chemistry in this context see François Pépin, La Philosophie expérimentale de Diderot et la 
chimie (Paris: Garnier, 2012). Diderot criticized physics for its abstraction and insisted that “it is from 
chemistry that it learns or will learn the real causes” of natural phenomena (Diderot, DPV IX, 209). 
His lecture notes were first published in 1887, and are now available in the standard edition of his 
works: Cours de chimie de Mr Rouelle (1756), in Diderot, DPV IX. Note that this criticism of physics 
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or the distillation still as a way to describe the body: “The animal is 
the laboratory in which sensitivity shifts from being inert to being 
active.”37
The other mistake is to take the man- machine model so literally, while 
it is really, primarily, an organic model, that is, an organism- centered 
model.38 Even when La Mettrie uses the celebrated mechanistic image 
of the watch or clock as an analogy for the brain’s capacity to think, in 
the opening paragraphs of L’Homme- Machine, when he states that the 
question, “can matter think?” is tantamount to asking “can matter tell 
time?” he is not literally saying that brains are like clocks, but rather 
putting forth a functional analogy between different arrangements 
of matter and their correspondingly different functional properties.39 
Again, La Mettrie is not asserting that the processes and properties of 
the specific material organization of the brain are the same as the pro-
cesses and properties of the specific material organization of a clock.
But also, Engels can be rebutted by showing that materialism had a 
more constitutive relation to the emerging life sciences and their ontol-
ogy (as in the case of Diderot’s “Spinozism” mentioned below) as well 
as to vitalism.40 Thinkers such as La Mettrie and Diderot articulated 
their form(s) of materialism, not just in direct dialogue with the emerg-
ing and evolving life sciences, particularly disciplines such as medicine, 
physiology and natural history (for Diderot: “there are no works I read 
is more or less identical with his criticism of mathematics in the name of a kind of irreducible embodi-
ment: “of all the physical sciences to which one has attempted to apply geometry, it appears that there 
are none in which it penetrates less than in Medicine” (Diderot, “Méchanicien,” 221). A variety of 
kindred spirits such as Buffon, Maupertuis, La Mettrie and Bonnet (who rejected materialism as a 
metaphysics) concurred in denying that the body is something that could be mathematized.
 37 Diderot “Lettre à Duclos,” October 10 1765, Corr., vol. 5, 141.
 38 Ann Thomson, “Mechanistic Materialism versus Vitalistic Materialism,” in Mécanisme et vitalisme, 
special issue of La Lettre de la Maison française d’Oxford, ed. M. Saad, 14 (2001).
 39 Timo Kaitaro, “‘Man is an admirable machine’— a dangerous idea?” In Mécanisme et vitalisme, 
special issue of La lettre de la Maison française d’Oxford, ed. M. Saad, 14 (2001).
 40 Charles T. Wolfe and Motoichi Terada. “The ‘Animal Economy’ as Object and Program in 
Montpellier Vitalism.” Science in Context 21, no. 4 (2008):  537– 579; Thomson, “Mechanistic 
Materialism versus Vitalistic Materialism.”
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with more pleasure than medical works”41), but more strongly, in such 
a way that the ontological implications of these sciences have a direct 
impact on the core philosophical commitments. This relation between 
core materialist commitments and new life science developments 
(here, generation/ development rather than medicine) is explicit in a 
particularly fascinating if brief text, Diderot’s article “Spinosiste” in the 
Encyclopédie.42 What is striking in this short article is that so- called 
“modern Spinozists” are presented as agreeing with the basic tenets of 
a metaphysics of substance and modes, and in addition as defenders of 
the biological theory of epigenesis, according to which the embryo is 
formed by successive addition of layers of material substance, without 
addition of any purely “informational” entity, as in preformationism.
The relation to vitalism deserves more analysis than can be provided 
here, not least because in this case, it consists of not one but two major 
misconceptions that are still common, including in major survey works 
like the Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science: that mate-
rialism reduces everything to matter and motion, while vitalism has as 
its basic principle an immaterial vital force or principle. The present 
essay builds on work we have done earlier on the eighteenth- century 
Montpellier vitalists, and nineteenth- century physiology and medi-
cine (from Bichat onwards), respectively.
Since our “Leitfaden” in this essay is the nonoppositional rela-
tion between machine models and embodiment, and thus between 
mechanistic and organismic explanations (if the latter are understood 
structurally rather than “foundationally,” i.e., as attempts to model 
organizational complexity rather than as a strong distinction between 
a foundational principle of order, unity, or individuality and the afore-
mentioned complexity), we will simply indicate for now that the case 
 41 Éléments, in Diderot, DPV XVII, 510.
 42 Enc. XV, 474. It is not signed by him but strongly resembles passages in his other works and 
is included in most editions of his complete works. For full discussion of this text see Charles T. 
Wolfe, “Epigenesis as Spinozism in Diderot’s Biological Project,” in The Life Sciences in Early Modern 
Philosophy, eds. O. Nachtomy and J.E.H. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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of vitalism, at least in some of its Enlightenment forms, can be shown 
to be much the same. That is, just as the reductionist potential of mate-
rialist explanations did not mean a denial of embodiment but rather 
a response to the (simultaneously ontological and explanatory) chal-
lenge of its existence, similarly, the vitalist insistence on the specific 
organizational complexity of living systems is not an insistence on 
ontological “otherness” with respect to mechanical models. Ménuret 
de Chambaud, one of the more intriguing of the physicians associated 
with the Montpellier School of Medicine, commonly referred to today 
as “Montpellier vitalists” (not least since they were the first to use 
the term and apply it to themselves), speaks of the “human machine,” 
playing on classic mechanistic language while adding on higher- level, 
chemical properties:
What is man? Or to avoid any misunderstanding … what is the 
human machine? It appears at first sight to be a harmonious com-
posite of various springs, each of which is impelled by its own 
motion but (which) all concur in the general motion; a general 
property especially restricted to organic composites, known as irri-
tability and sensibility spreads through all springs, animates them, 
vivifies them and excites their motions. But, modified in each organ, 
it infinitely varies their actions and motions:  it leads the various 
springs to tighten against one another, to resist, to press, act and 
mutually influence one another. This reciprocal commixture sus-
tains motions, no action without reaction. From this continuous 
antagonism of actions, life and health result.43
There is a kind of equilibrium here— for if we no longer have an 
autonomous, immaterial soul controlling the motions of a mechani-
cally defined body, a more unified, more immanent picture of vital 
 43 Ménuret de Chambaud, “Spasme,” Enc. XV, 435b.
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activity is needed. Ménuret observed this quite sharply, in his ambi-
tious and programmatic article for the Encyclopédie on the “animal 
economy”:
This idea that the soul is the efficient cause of phenomena because it 
is the origin (principe) of vital motions is not an undeniable truth. It 
is true that if our body was a brute, inorganic machine, it would nec-
essarily have to be directed by some other agent, maintaining and 
powering its motions. And I do not think the errors of the mecha-
nists stem from anything else than the fact that they do not hold 
animals to be living, organized composites.44
The human machine or organic machine is thus not literally the 
same as another “brute” machine; but the difference lies neither in 
a “soul” nor in a “vital principle.” Rather, it is one of organizational 
complexity.45 These models of biological “organization,” including the 
“animal economy,” which in many respects is a direct predecessor of 
the organism concept, as when its practitioners oppose it to merely 
mechanical explanations of the living body (in Wolfe and Terada’s, 
“Animal Economy”), open up a conceptual space which sometimes 
resembles a kind of “expanded mechanism,” sometimes a heuristic 
vitalism which would remain compatible with mechanistic accounts 
of specific lower- level organs and functions (in Bordeu and Ménuret 
de Chambaud notably46), in the sense that these models would seek to 
understand higher- level functions— from digestion and fevers to sleep 
and perhaps Life itself— while not losing sight of lower- level entities 
and processes enabling the higher functions.
 44 Ménuret de Chambaud, “Œconomie Animale (Méd.),” Enc. XI, 364b.
 45 We leave open here the possible comparison with Leibnizian “machines of nature,” which are also 
defined by a specific organizational complexity, as discussed in the chapter by Ohad Nachtomy in the 
present volume, “Leibniz’s view of Living Beings: Embodied or Nested Individuals.”
 46 See E. Williams’ helpful comment particularly regarding Bordeu: “Mechanists had long attributed 
glandular action to the compression of glandular bodies by surrounding muscle and bone, but by 1750 
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What then of nineteenth- century medicine in the wake of vitalism and 
newer, more sophisticated mechanistic models?
4. From Bichat to Bernard (Embodiment 
in Physiology after 1800: The “French 
Connection”)
Late eighteenth- century physiologists inherited from the medicine of 
the animal economy— whether that of Montpellier vitalists, or Scottish 
and English physiologists like the school of Munro and Cullen47— a 
concern with specifying the proper vital properties likely to support 
the functioning of the “machine”:sensibility, contractility, irritability, 
and elasticity. Some carried on experiments on frogs to capture the role 
of electricity within the nervous system (so- called Galvanism). Haller’s 
milestone textbook, the Principles of Physiology, was very influential 
and his experiments to isolate the properties of sensitivity and irrita-
bility48 triggered a trend towards experiments in physiology— even 
though the scope and use of experimentation and especially vivisec-
tion were also critically discussed at the time and opposed the value 
of observation, as Ménuret did in his “Observation” entry in the 
Encyclopédie.49 At the same time, medicine initiated its turn towards 
it was widely recognized that this approach did nothing to explain why particular glands secreted par-
ticular fluids. Indeed it was in regard to this problem that vitalists first made inroads against mecha-
nists, denying the explanatory power of such a model for glandular action and substituting for it a 
view based on the ‘internal sensations’ alluded to earlier, specifically the ‘taste’ or ‘desire’ of the gland 
that determined which components of blood it drew to itself and acted upon in furtherance of its 
specific function”; see “Sciences of Appetite in the Enlightenment, 1750- 1800,” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43, 
no. 2 (2012), 398.
 47 John P. Wright, “Metaphysics and Physiology. Mind, Body, and the Animal Economy in 
Eighteenth- Century Scotland,” in Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Michael 
A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990).
 48 Albrecht von Haller, A Dissertation on the Sensible and Irritable Parts of Animals (London, J. 
Nourse: 1755; reprint, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press: 1936).
 49 On experimentation in physiology in the earlier vitalist context see Charles T. Wolfe, “Vitalism 
and the Resistance to Experimentation on Life in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of the History 
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clinical medicine, with the idea that disease is a (possibly local) altera-
tion of a functional organism rather than a “species” which would be 
instantiated by the diseased body. Bichat’s work, spanning medicine 
and physiology, was elaborated around 1800 at the crossroads of those 
trends. As has been extensively studied, he instituted foundations for 
anatomo- clinical medicine by showing that diseases should ultimately 
be traced back to the altered tissues,50 the basic building- bricks of an 
organism, while his Anatomy (Anatomie générale, 1798; Anatomie 
descriptive, 1802) inventoried the twenty- one various types of tissue in 
detail.51 His physiology undertook, in the wake of Haller, a system-
atic experimental investigation of the functioning and death of the 
organism’s main organs. We take this physiology as a major locus for 
elaborating an embodiment concept in the life sciences, along the lines 
described below.
i. The general argument. Making embodiment into an object 
of experimental science
Bichat’s physiology put forth three types of principles: a definition of 
life as the set of functions that resist death;52 a specification of tissues 
in terms of their elementary properties of sensitivity and contractility 
in his anatomical works; and a division between what he called the two 
lives (i.e. the organic life and the animal life).53 The first life— universal 
of Biology 46, no. 2 (2013) and for Bichat and the nineteenth- century context, Philippe Huneman, 
Bichat: La vie et la mort (Paris: PUF, 1998).
 50 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la clinique (Paris:  PUF, 1963); Toby Gelfand, Professionalizing 
Modern Medicine : Paris Surgeons and Medical Science and Institutions in the 18th Century (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood, 1980).
 51 James E. Lesch, Science and Medicine in France: The Emergence of Experimental Physiology, 1790– 
1855 (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1984). For Auguste Comte, this was one major 
foundation of biology as a science (Cours de philosophie positive [Paris: Hermann, 1982], 41ème leçon, 
p. 752).
 52 Bichat, Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort [1800], second edition. Paris:  Brosson & 
Gabon, 1802), 1.
 53 Bichat, Recherches, Book I,  chapter 2.
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among living things— is described as a “relation between the organ-
ism and itself ”; the second— proper to animals— is described as its 
relationship to the external environment. Interestingly, it is a new way 
of conceiving of the traditional distinction between “vital functions” 
and “animal functions”— here, in terms of distinct logical kinds of rela-
tionship, namely reflexive or correlational. It is here that the notion of 
embodiment seems to find its way into physiology: organisms include 
a sort of inner space through which they can be related to themselves.54 
This basic duplication or reflexivity supports the very idea of function-
ality and functions in Bichat’s physiology.
In other words, what ontologically characterizes the animal are those 
two “lives” and their relations. Within each life, one finds “functions” 
in the sense of “major biological functions”— respiration, digestion, 
motion, perception. And then, each of these functions is achieved 
through the “functions of several organs”— the eyes see, the stomach 
decomposes nutriments, etc. Those are the functions in a second sense, 
“local functions,” functions that the physiologist first tries to identify 
(“what’s the function of this organ?”) and then, analyze (“through 
which mechanism is this function achieved?”) and more precisely for 
Bichat, “which specific combination of tissues, endowed with their 
specific properties, is required for this function to be carried on?”).55 
Functions, in both senses, are the elementary units required to ana-
lyze and understand the existence of lives and their essential relations. 
Thus, the bipartition of lives defines the territory of functional analysis 
 54 This conceptual distinction between organic and animal life was highly praised by nineteenth- 
century post- Kantian philosophers. Hegel appreciated it greatly in his lectures on the philosophy of 
nature and turned it into a dialectical opposition between merely organic life and a life in which 
the animal “lives outside of its body” (in Bichat’s own terms). (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, eds. E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970). II: Naturphilosophie, 3: Organische Physik, C. Der tierische Organismus, 
§ 355). His opponent Schopenhauer saw it as a massive proof, through empirical science, of his own 
distinction between representation and will: the organic life is the will, the animal life is representa-
tion, and Bichat’s thesis, according to which passions originate from the epigastrum— namely the cen-
ter of organic life (hence the life related to itself and not to any object)— confirms the philosopher’s 
thesis about the originality of the will (Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, Suppl. X).
 55 Bichat, Recherches I,  chapter 1, “Division générale de la vie.”
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for physiology, which is classically indeed oriented toward functions, 
while anatomy is oriented towards structures and can therefore rely on 
mere observations.
“Embodiment” here refers first of all to organic life as— in phe-
nomenological terms— what differentiates any living body (includ-
ing plants) from mere bodies (a space of reflexivity so to speak); and 
second, the articulation between organic and animal life, which 
makes it possible for the animal to be an embodied agent behaving 
in the world. Before examining the move from Bichat’s inaugural 
experimental physiology to Claude Bernard’s ambiguous position 
regarding embodiment and vitalism, it is worth mentioning that the 
latter’s most famous idea, that of the milieu intérieur or “internal 
environment,” could be seen as an additional extension of Bichat’s 
idea of vie organique. The milieu intérieur, as is well known, is the 
set of liquids (mostly) in which each organ of the organism lies, and 
which mediates the communications between organs, and, above all, 
between each organ and the external environment.56 The conceptual 
divide between an external and an internal “milieu” allows Bernard 
to account for the fact that organisms are not directly determined by 
changes in their milieu (e.g., their temperature does not covary with 
external temperature; their glucose rate is not immediately affected 
by glucose intake from the external environment etc.) without giv-
ing up on general determinism— that is, the idea that in a given set 
of conditions, the same effect will always happen. The exact mecha-
nism (in Bernardian terms, le déterminisme) that governs animal 
functioning and behavior is not a strict relation between organism 
and the external milieu, but a double relationship, between organs 
and their milieu intérieur, and then between this milieu intérieur 
and the external environment. To this extent, the state variables that 
describe the trajectories of each organ are not directly affected by the 
 56 Claude Bernard, Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale (Paris:  J.B. Baillière & Fils, 
1865), 115; Principes de médecine expérimentale (Paris: J.B. Baillière & Fils, 1882), 25.
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modification of environmental variables; the milieu intérieur some-
how buffers them against external extreme and rapid changes likely 
to be met by the organism.
Claude Bernard’s milieu intérieur can then easily be understood 
as an operationalizable way to understand what Bichat called the 
“lives” of the animal:  it is the medium of the relation between the 
animal and itself, which Bichat termed “vie organique.” In this sense, 
the “milieu intérieur” can be seen as a figure of animal embodiment, 
inherited from Bichat’s physiological bipartitioning of lives, which 
can be can be analyzed regarding its composition and potential alter-
ation as a specified mix of liquids, and thus addressed by the tools 
of chemistry (toxicological analysis, etc.), which is the way through 
which Bernard intends to make experimental physiology more rigor-
ously scientific, and therefore overcome vitalism.57
ii. Embodiment in experimental physiology, from Bichat 
to Bernard— or how determinism and vitalism come into play
It is impossible to account for this conceptual history without high-
lighting the fact that in Bichat’s concepts in anatomy (e.g., tissue 
[Anatomie générale] and physiology [Recherches physiologiques]) these 
two “lives” were systematically related, and both were embedded in a 
specific physiological experimental device for producing knowledge. 
Bichat was clearly a vitalist, in the sense that he acknowledged a prin-
cipled opposition between living and brute matter, and insisted on the 
fact that living matter could not display the same regularity and gen-
erality that characterizes brute matter.58 Epistemologically, this means 
that whereas physicists unveil laws of nature, under the form of what 
philosophers would now call a set of general counterfactual- supporting 
 57 See Mirko Drazen Grmek, Raisonnement expérimental et recherches toxicologiques chez Claude 
Bernard (Geneva: Droz, 1973).
 58 Bichat, Anatomie générale, 37.
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statements, physiologists can neither access robust counterfactuals 
such as: “if organism A were heated it would do such and such,” nor 
claim general statements such as “swans like to eat eels.” The former 
impossibility Bichat understands as, somehow, the plasticity of the liv-
ing (i.e., answers to stimulation are variable);59 the latter is the “idio-
syncrasy” of the living. This conceptual opposition is neatly stated in 
physiology under the form of a famous metaphysical opposition: “la 
vie c’est l’ensemble des fonctions qui résistent à la mort” that cannot but 
remind us of Stahl’s Theoria medica vera, in which chemical forces con-
spire towards the death of living animated bodies. However, elsewhere 
Bichat curiously acknowledges that this quite classical formulation 
of the singularity of life is somehow contingent and hinges upon the 
historical sequence of the invention of scientific theories: had humans 
invented physiology and not physics first, he said, instead of talking 
of forces and weight when we try to understand the living they would 
talk in terms of pulses, sympathies, secretions, etc. when they would 
describe motions of bodies, flowing of rivers, etc.60
The second part of Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort, 
“Recherches sur la mort,” is crucial in the articulation between physi-
ology and anatomy because it somehow legitimizes the scientificity 
of physiology, even though one should acknowledge the strong vital-
ism to which Bichat was committed, as indicated by his ideas about 
plasticity and idiosyncrasy. We will not enter into the details of this 
epistemological structure.61 Suffice it to say that in this work Bichat 
investigates the way each of the three major organs (in the physiologi-
cal tradition he inherits)— namely brain, lung, and heart— conditions 
 59 Bichat, Recherches I,  chapter 4.,.
 60 Recherches, 77- 78. This interesting remark about the contingency of some of the most deeply 
entrenched ingredients of our conceptual scheme is recalled here in order to indicate that the con-
ceptual and metaphysical opposition between the brute and the living should not be taken as a proof 
of the epistemic inferiority of physiology as compared to physics. It is an anticipated rebuttal of any 
physics envy, so to speak.
 61 For more details see Huneman, Bichat: La vie et la mort.
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the death of the two others (e.g., how does the death of the brain cause 
the death of the lungs?) Is it direct or happening through the death of 
the heart? Each question is answered by the construction of a sophisti-
cated device that neutralizes one organ in an organism slowly enough 
to make manifest all the downstream effects. To this extent, what these 
physiological researches about death show are the sets of necessities 
required to sustain life in a healthy organism. Even though life is plas-
tic and idiosyncratic, so that no gathering of observations would let us 
know anything about life in general and its manifestations, we can still, 
through these experimental devices, understand which set of necessary 
conditionings yields in general all the various manifestations of physi-
ological functioning and therefore life.
One especially important object for Bichat in this framework of 
study is constituted by the relationship between the two lives— since 
the brain is the major organ for the vie animale and the heart is the 
crucial organ for the vie organique. Therefore, the physiological appa-
ratus that explores the sets of necessary conditionings proper to sustain 
life— conditionings which involve primarily the heart and the brain— 
is capable of showing us how the two lives relate to one another.
We earlier hypothesized that Bichat grasped embodiment as vie 
organique, conceptualized it in the complex structure of knowledge 
that articulates vie organique and vie animale, and then related both of 
them into a rich anatomical structure implementing them and decom-
posable at the level of tissues rather than organs. If this hypothesis is 
correct, we also understand now that a new path taken by the history 
of embodiment in the nineteenth century goes through the novel 
structure of physiology that Bichat elaborated, which centered around 
the figure of the dying animal, whose death is monitored and grasped 
by complex experimental apparatuses.
As indicated, the next step in this sketch of a history of “clinical 
embodiment” was taken by Claude Bernard. But before that, however, 
it is important to consider the work of Bichat’s major disciple, who was 
the teacher of Claude Bernard (a préparateur for his lectures from 1841 
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on): François Magendie, himself a famous physician and physiologist 
at the College de France (1831– 1855), even though the fame of his disci-
ple finally eclipsed his own. Magendie indeed pursued Bichat’s project 
of establishing experimental physiology as a science, as it is clear from 
reading his Précis élémentaire de physiologie (1816– 1817). However, in 
contemporary terms one could say that deflationism and minimalism 
were crucial in his approach, in medicine as well as in physiology.
Magendie was a supporter of what is called “expectant medicine,” 
which means the preference for not intervening on a diseased patient, 
and letting nature naturally bring recovery. This attitude stems from 
two ideas, one which concerns philosophy of nature and consists in an 
Aristotelian or Hippocratic confidence in the healing power of nature 
itself, the other an epistemic skepticism regarding all human ways of 
intervening in the complex working of pathological conditions. Here 
the old slogan “primum non nocere” is pushed to its limits: since any 
intervention is potentially harmful, and we subscribe to a principle of 
not being harmful, it’s better not to intervene at all.
In physiology too, Magendie was somehow deflationist, for he 
was precisely deflating Bichat’s vitalism, in a very interesting way. For 
Magendie, the idea that unknown forces lead organisms and organismic 
tissues to behave in an unpredictable, plastic, and idiosyncratic way is 
absurd: since these forces are unknown, we cannot even ascribe these 
properties to them. There is a roman of the vital properties which basi-
cally is “the philosophers’ anthropomorphism applied to molecules.”62 
It is therefore more rational to say that we don’t know anything about 
the substance of what behaves in physiological and biological ways, and 
be content with describing these behaviors as well as all the regularities 
we can observe, then relating them to chemical and physical regulari-
ties involved in them that our physiological devices can make manifest. 
Science is about detecting regular correlations rather than unraveling 
 62 François Magendie, Précis élémentaire de physiologie [1816], 2d rev. ed. (Paris: Méquignon- Marvis, 
1825), 30.
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hidden natures: paradigmatically, the glory of Newton does not consist 
in having “discovered attraction,” but in having “established that it acts 
as a direct function of the mass, and inverse of the squared distance.”63
Magendie therefore gives up Bichat’s commitment to a metaphysical 
opposition between the living and the nonliving; according to him, 
this statement would go far beyond what our observations and experi-
ments allow us to claim. Nothing authorizes us to draw any principled 
differences between the metaphysical forces that support physiologi-
cal properties and behavior and the physical forces that explain the 
natural phenomena investigated by physicists. Actually, the apparent 
irregularities, variations, and unpredictability that we see in the case 
of physiology and pathology could perfectly be ascribed to a lack of 
understanding, observation, and information on our part, with no 
need to attribute these properties to the natural forces themselves. We 
could only hope that progress in our observations and experiments 
would ultimately bridge the gap between the degree of completeness 
of our knowledge in physics and the then- current state of physiology.
Magendie’s skepticism as such is not especially telling for the his-
tory of embodiment. In this regard, one could even argue that whereas 
Bichat’s vitalism allowed him to conceptualize the two lives and make 
“embodiment” into a concept which can be encompassed in the proj-
ect of an experimental physiology, Magendie’s denial of vitalism, 
epistemological skepticism, and almost phenomenalist philosophy 
of scientific method64 is extraneous to the history of the avatars of 
embodiment. However, this skepticism plays an important logical role 
in our story, because it provides the grounds on which Claude Bernard 
will elaborate some of its most crucial concepts, including the elements 
 63 Magendie, Précis, 15.
 64 “All phenomena of life can be traced back to nutrition and vital action ultimately; but the hidden 
motions constituting those two phenomena being out of scope of our senses, it’s not to them that we 
should pay attention: we limit ourselves to studying their results, that is in the physical properties of 
the organs, and search for the content with the physical properties of the organs, and search for the 
way the ones and the others concur to the general life” (Précis, 37).
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of a theory of milieu intérieur in various general publications, from the 
Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale (1855) to the Leçons 
sur les phénomènes de la vie communs aux végétaux et aux animaux, the 
published version of his lectures at the Collège de France in 1873.
Magendie was not exactly a pure behaviorist or phenomenalist. He 
admits some “forces” that are involved in living phenomena, and that 
are manifested each time a biological phenomenon occurs, since he 
acknowledges that there may be an unknown force acting within living 
bodies (see Table 1). However, he refuses, against what he sees as vital-
ism, to ascribe to them some distinct properties (such as plasticity, etc.) 
that would make them proper to the living realm (i.e. treating them as 
ontological entities that instantiate a specific and independent onto-
logical realm). Instead, he conceives of these forces as pure unknown 
references or designations that we make in specific contexts of sci-
entific descriptions. We just label “vital force,” he says, “an unknown 
cause of the phenomenon of life.” We have to recognize these forces, 
because they are supporting the constant connections between phe-
nomena that we can identify through experiments and observations, 
and because we need them to turn the mere establishment of connec-
tions into useful relationships of causality.
Actually, even though he applies Bichat’s ideal of experimental phys-
iology, Magendie’s metaphysical views are not so far from Barthez’s 
vitalism, in which a vital “principle” was understood as a sort of 
unknown, and physiology is an effort to grasp the systematic mani-
festations of this principle through organized machines. Therefore, 
Magendie could be seen as a vitalist in the sense of those embodied vital-
ist thinkers, or “materialist vitalists” discussed in section 3, rather than 
in the sense of Bichat, whose vitalism is more exclusive vis- à- vis ordi-
nary materialism. Yet one needs just one more step to definitively get 
rid of these vital forces and the meager commitments to vitalism that 
could therefore be found in Magendie’s writings, notwithstanding his 
own wording.
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Claude Bernard’s idea of “determinism”— as it is explicated care-
fully in his two books on the methodology of experimental physiol-
ogy or medicine65— takes this step. Since what physiology establishes 
is in many cases a regular succession of physiological events, such as 
for example, the secretion of sugar when the liver is left alone, or the 
neutralization of the parasympathetic nervous system when curare 
touches it, it is unnecessary to stipulate an unknown force which, so 
to say, makes this connection. What exists is this mere connection, 
whose existence has to be attested and demonstrated through careful 
and methodical investigation. Physiology aims at unraveling all these 
connections. These are what we now call the mechanisms implement-
ing some specific functions: for instance, the mechanism of the gluco-
neogenic function of the liver, which allows animals to produce their 
own glucose and therefore not rely on consuming plants to gather one 
of the crucial constituents they need (glucose). Experimental physiol-
ogy thereby does two things: identifying functions (e.g. the gluconeo-
genic function, etc.)and finding the mechanisms that implement such 
functions.
A Bernardian function is actually a more fine- grained instantiation 
of the sets of necessary conditioning that Bichat intended to expli-
cate through his researches sur la mort. A mechanism implementing a 
function is often established through the same method Bichat system-
atically elaborated: disturbing or killing some of the tissue putatively 
involved in the realization of the function, identifying the subsequent 
effects of the intervention, and finally summing up this information 
about the effects of the controlled disturbances and reconstituting the 
mechanism.66
 65 See Jean Gayon, “Déterminisme génétique, déterminisme bernardien, déterminisme laplacien,” in 
Le hasard au cœur de la cellule: Probabilités, déterminisme, génétique, ed. J.- J. Kupiec (Paris: Editions 
Syllepse, 2009), on Bernadian and Laplacian determinism.
 66 Grmek, Raisonnement toxicologique.
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Bernard calls “a determinism” the “mechanism” that the research 
unravels. This “determinism” should not be confused with another 
meaning of determinism, which is nevertheless bound to it— namely, 
the metaphysical principle of determinism, stating that any effect 
produced in a given set of circumstances, will reoccur once the same 
set of circumstance is reactivated. This principle, obviously not 
falsifiable— since any putative falsification could in fact be traced back 
to a fine- grained undetected break- up of the identity of conditions— is 
necessary for science to be possible, and especially, for any experimen-
tal physiology67, such as the science which was modeled by Bichat’s 
devices of animal experimentation.
According to this viewpoint, no vital forces of any kind are there-
fore necessary to account for the regular and necessary connections 
established by experimental physiology. “Vital phenomena are not 
manifestations of a free and independent principle. One cannot grasp 
this inner living principle, isolate it and act on it. On the contrary one 
sees vital acts having constantly as conditions some external physico- 
chemical circumstances, perfectly determined and capable of hinder-
ing or allowing their appearance.”68 Bernard’s determinism succeeds in 
getting rid of Magendie’s deflated vitalism. Interestingly, the arguably 
metaphysical principle of general determinism— and its connection to 
the idea of “le déterminisme de,” as a target of experimental research— 
permits the elimination of this other metaphysical idea: the “unknown 
forces” or the vital forces that a whole tradition of physiologists postu-
lated, from Bordeu to Magendie through Barthez or Bichat. Moreover 
Bernard does not hesitate to explicitly reject Bichat’s famous dual-
istic and conflict- centered definition of life:  “Science, one must say, 
has debunked this definition, according to which there would be two 
kinds of properties within living bodies: physical properties, and vital 
 67 Bernard, Introduction.
 68 Claude Bernard, Leçons sur les phénomènes de la vie communs aux animaux et aux végétaux, vol. II 
(Paris: Germer Baillière, 1879).
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properties, constantly fighting, and tending to predominate the ones 
over the others.”69
Such is the logic governing the construction of the concept of 
“milieu intérieur.” Organisms seem to be plastic and idiosyncratic, as 
Bichat initially recalled; however, no vital forces govern them. There 
are just sets of determinisms to be investigated. What is therefore the 
reason for the seemingly unconnectedness between environmental 
events such as cold, increase in temperature, etc., and the organismic 
behavior— an unconnectedness that seems to challenge the idea of 
a general and predictable (nomothetic) connectedness between all 
events and things in physical nature? This “unconnectedness” would, 
in our terms, relate to the acknowledgement of this “embodiment” 
which is the focus of our story. And it can be accounted for in terms 
of a specific kind of determinism, which would explain the appar-
ent disconnection by mediating the relation between the organs of 
the organisms and the external environment. What Claude Bernard 
achieves here is a way of allowing for a scientific conceptualization of 
embodiment.
To put it bluntly, the “milieu intérieur” is a privileged object for 
Bernardian physiology— but it is also a tool, because any modification 
of the organism that can be controlled and measured, in order to under-
stand an organism’s proper patterns of causality, should either initially 
modify some parameters of this milieu, or influence its composition. 
More generally, experimental physiology uses the tools of toxicology 
in order to show how the tiny alterations of some liquids constituting 
the milieu intérieur entail major disturbances of some organs— or how 
perturbations of these organs (e.g., the curare neutralizing neurotrans-
mission in the parasympathetic nervous system) are diffracted through 
various layers of the milieu intérieur.
 69 Bernard, Leçons sur les phénomènes communs.
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Embodiment therefore appears as epistemologically crucial in the 
deterministic science of living things. This would be the last twist given 
to the idea of embodiment, once it took the path of experimental phys-
iology, under the mode of a vie organique as understood by Bichat.
5. Conclusion
Common perceptions of early modern mechanism, of Enlightenment 
materialism, and of the genesis of nineteenth- century experimental 
medicine (and biochemistry), all share a tacit, sometimes explicit sup-
position that these must rule out the richness, the experiential texture, 
the significance of “embodiment.” Thus Ian Hacking recently spoke in 
rather mournful tones of our current “Cartesian bodies”:  no longer 
machines governed by immaterial souls, but nevertheless fully mechan-
ical assemblages of replaceable parts, whether prostheses or artificially 
grown biological parts.70 Similarly, Terry Eagleton warned that the 
body of embodiment discourse was quite remote from biology— ”the 
plastic, remouldable, socially constructed body, not the piece of matter 
that sickens and dies.”71 But if Descartes already warned (thus defus-
ing one giant phenomenological objection against him in advance) 
that we should not conceive of the mind in the body like a sailor (or 
pilot) in a ship72— and if in some moments in Cartesian physiology, 
 70 Ian Hacking, “The Cartesian Body,” BioSocieties 1, no. 1 (2006):  13– 15. Notice that an entire 
mini- generation of prominent Descartes scholars has rejected this reading, emphasizing instead an 
“embodied Descartes,” as we noted in Section 2. But that doesn’t affect the prevalence of our common 
concept of the “Cartesian body,” often associated with a “scientific” image of the body.
 71 “Postmodernism is obsessed by the body and terrified of biology. The body is a wildly popular 
topic in US cultural studies— but this is the plastic, remouldable, socially constructed body, not the 
piece of matter that sickens and dies. The creature who emerges from postmodern thought is centre-
less, hedonistic, self- inventing, ceaselessly adaptive. He sounds more like a Los Angeles media execu-
tive than an Indonesian fisherman” (Terry Eagleton, After Theory [London: Allen Lane, 2003], 186).
 72 “It is not sufficient for [the rational soul] to be lodged in the human body like a helmsman in 
his ship … but that it must be more closely joined and united with the body in order to … con-
stitute a real human being” (AT VI 59; CSM I  141), cf. Geir Kirkebøen, “Descartes’ Embodied 
Psychology:  Descartes or Damasio’s Error?” Journal of the History of the Neurosciences 10, no. 2 
(2001), 181.
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La Mettrie and eighteenth- century vitalist medicine and on to Claude 
Bernard, we are faced with different rearrangements of the conceptual 
landscape in which mechanism, body and the concept we here term 
“embodiment” are constantly overlapping, modifying and overdeter-
mining one another— the status of embodiment in relation to life sci-
ence requires some fresh consideration.
Where certain discussions of embodiment tend to emphasize its cul-
tural embeddedness or its presence in literary texts of the period at 
the expense of so- called scientific works, we would instead point to 
the series of “negotiations” or displacements in which, from early mod-
ern automata to scientific physiology in the nineteenth century, and 
in theoretical constellations we could term “vitalism” but also “vital 
materialism,” the idea of “organism as individuality” (as Bernard put 
it), of the body- machine as necessarily my own, given that it is an affec-
tive, desiring, hedonistic entity,73 come to the fore.
Among these negotiations, we insisted on the last one, which culmi-
nated with Claude Bernard’s idea of physiology— wherein the milieu 
intérieur appeared not only as a crucial concept, but also as an orga-
nizing principle. Now assuming that embodiment of the living is at 
least partly about the way living beings can relate to themselves in a 
way which mediates their relation to their environment and ultimately 
specifies their specific patterns of behavior, the construction of the 
concept of milieu intérieur, together with its embedding within a spe-
cific experimental set of practices inaugurated by Bichat’s Recherches 
physiologiques, is a crucial moment in the history of embodiment:  it 
becomes the correlate of an operational scientific practice. Bernard 
inherits some of the strictures Bichat imposed onto physiological 
knowledge:  pervasiveness of an apparatus that displays, through the 
 73 “To be a machine, to feel, to think, to know how to distinguish good from evil, as well as blue from 
yellow, in a word, to be born with an intelligence and a sure moral instinct, and to be but an animal, is 
thus no more contradictory, than to be an ape or a parrot and to know how to give oneself pleasure” 
(La Mettrie, L’Homme- Machine, in Œuvres philosophiques, I, 192).
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making of regular sequences of dying (and here, Bernard replaces 
Bichat’s mechanical death with mostly chemical ways of killing organ-
isms or organs, via toxic substances) the essential organic relationships 
of causality or conditioning.
Now whereas Bichat understood embodiment under the mode 
of a specific life and tied it to a vitalism that accepts contingent and 
unpredictable changes of regime— which oppose any nomothetic 
understanding and possibly scientificity— Claude Bernard invests the 
Bichatian structures of physiological knowledge into a milieu intéri-
eur, which is less directly laden with the idea of “life” and the notion 
of vitalism, and which allows for determinism and scientific manipu-
lation.74 In concluding the last section, we pinpointed a logical link 
between giving up the notion of vital forces— even the deflationary 
forces postulated by Magendie— elaborating the idea of determinism 
and the many determinisms as objects of experimental knowledge in 
physiology, and finally, elaborating the notion of milieu intérieur as 
a set of determinisms that mediate between organs (on which physi-
ology either intervenes, or notices the effects of interventions) and 
physical and chemical variables describing the environment. This logic 
supported the constitution of perhaps the last figure of “embodiment,” 
taken in the context of the story of its progressive acculturation within 
a physiology that progressively turned into “experimental physiology” 
during the nineteenth century.
From Cartesian mechanism and automata (a case not discussed 
here) as engagements with the organizational complexities of living 
being, through a kind of historico- scientific dialectic of materialism 
and vitalism in philosophy, medicine, and physiology in the eighteenth 
 74 Bernard spoke of “le vrai vitalisme de B(ichat)” in his Carnet de notes— an expression he crossed 
out. The letter “B” referred to Bichat (G. Canguilhem, “Claude Bernard et Bichat,” in Études d’Histoire 
et de philosophie des sciences [Paris: Vrin, 1968], 157). This is not an essay on the dialectics of the fig-
ures of vitalism in nineteenth- century medicine and philosophy but it is worth noting that a series of 
these figures engaging both in new articulations of experimental, laboratory- driven life science and 
in reflections on the nature of life shift and negotiate positions in an uneasy ballet with the notion of 
“vitalism”.
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and nineteenth centuries, we arrived at Bichat, Magendie, and Claude 
Bernard. Rather than a linear progression from “blind mechanism” to 
the complexities of embodiment, with the discovery of the milieu inté-
rieur, we are faced instead with a perpetual elaboration of mechanisms 
or organizational wholes in which a “vitalistic” component is never 
entirely eliminated, nor entirely acknowledged. As Bernard puts it, 
“The final component of the phenomenon is physical, but the arrange-
ment is vital.”75 Or, in La Mettrie’s terms, “That the mind possesses such 
a corporeal nature need not be feared as a blow to our self- esteem.”76
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